The Outcome Of The Korean War

The Outcome Of The Korean fightThe Korean state of war officially began on 25 Jun 1950 when drags of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK newton Korea) invaded the Republic of Korea (ROK S byh Korea). After initial stunning successes by both sides, there then followed over 3 days of bloody combat which ultimately ended in an uneasy status quo ante bellum which silent persists.The central hypothesis to this paper is that the use of troops force was an effective policy tool for all whileies involved to meet define political objectives. The degree of success that each state/organisation achieved will be examined in detail. This model about will be limited to analysing the conflicts immediate afterwardsmath and will not consider events beyond the Geneva Conference in Apr 1954. Specifically, this essay will investigate the rationale that led the DPRKs leader (Kim Il call) to consider the use of military force to achieve his primary objective of linking Korea. Th e causes of the Korean fight will similarly be briefly examined to set analysis in context.CausesThe decisive event that caused the Korean War was the decision by ii US Army Colonels on 10 August 1945 to divide Korea at the 38th parallel1. The decision was taken on Aug 10 1945 and for no smash reason than it would place the capital city Seoul in the Ameri plenty zone.2From the moment that the Korean partition decision was made public, the leaders of the DPRK and ROK were essentially determined to fall in a merge country by diplomatical or military means. Indeed, m either(prenominal) in the get together States were worried that the ROK would invade the DPRK first, such was the bellicose blandishment emanating from the ROK President Synghman Rhee. The dividing declination on the 38th parallel did not have any historical significance to Koreans of any faction and the imposition of an arbitrary dividing line by the joint Soviet/ fall in Commission in Korea came as a total shoc k3. Indeed, Bruce Cumings asserts that the interim joined States occupation forces n wee became as unpopular as the newly ousted Japanese once the 38th Parallel decision became widely known4.It can wherefore be argued that nascent nationalism, united with diametrically opposed ideologies and the unfortunate choice of an arbitrary dividing line provided the catalyst for the DPRK onslaught of the ROK on 25 Jun 1950. It can also be postulated that Kim Il birdsong was left with little option but to resort to military means to bring about his desired end state of unifying Korea.Military outcomesFrom its inception, the Korean War was viewed as a limited war by the leash combatants, who (albeit for different reasons) had no wish to see the conflict escalate into a wider conflagration. The military outcome of the Korean War was indeterminate, with neither side emerging as a clear victor. After the initial period of manoeuvre (from Jun 1950 Jun 1951) the Korean War settled into a stalem ate reminiscent of World War 1 trench warfare. With neither side willing to escalate the conflict to gain a decisive edge, continued operations by UN and Communist forces essentially became a series of (relatively) pointless battles5in order to gain territory or practice political leverage at the Armistice negotiations in Panmunjom. When the Korean Armistice was formally signed on 27 Jul 1953, a heavily fortified Demilitarized district (DMZ) was completed following front line positions. Neither side could claim victory in the true sense of the word.Political and Strategic Objectives of the Soviet couplerDue to chronic instability in the ROK, the Korean peninsula perhaps presented the best opportunity for a commie leaning buffer state to be established that would protect Soviet and Chinese borders from any perceived American threat. The northern portion of Korea was occupied by Soviet troops, who apace moved to uphold autochthonous communist orientated commissariats. Kim Il Su ng emerged as the favoured choice of the Soviet leadership and the DPRK was established in 1948. Once it became clear that Korea would not be unified by political means alone, and the Soviet center had successfully adjudicateed an atomic bomb, Stalin lastly gave his consent and backing to Kim Il Sung6to proceed with the impact of the ROK, but was purportedly unwilling to widen the conflict and risk a wider war with the USA7.Stalin viewed the Korean conflict as a key part of a wider Soviet strategy to embroil the USA (and its allies) in a protracted struggle far away from what both sides regarded as the Centre of sedateness in Europe. In this the Soviets largely succeeded as the USA became wedded to the defence of the ROK on a point of principle after the DPRK onslaught. Stalin also determined that it would be perhaps better for the Soviet Union to engage in conflict with the fall in States at an early juncture, rather than to wait for Germany and Japan to be re-armed, which w ould greatly increase atomic number 74ern military capabilityStalin added that even if the USA provoked a big war, let it take place now rather than a few years later, when Japanese militarism will be restored as an American ally, and when the unite States and Japan will possess a military spring-board on the virtuous in the form of Rhees Korea.8The Soviet Unions relationship with china was crucial. Stalin viewed newly communist mainland China as the junior partner in the communist world. While mental object to provide administrative, technical and planning advice, Stalin determined that the Soviet Union would not become undecidedly involved in any Korean conflict in order to avoid a direct presentation with the United States. Kim Il Sung visited Moscow in Apr 1950 during this period, Stalin laid out the terms of any DPRK invasion of the ROK asThe Chinese (specifically Mao Zedong) must approve the invasionThe DPRK invasion must appear as a counter to an ROK move into the DPRKa nd that Kim Il Sung would not be able to rely on overt Soviet support if the USA intervened, but would have to rely on Chinese support9.In essence, Stalin determined that there were great advantages to a conflict being fought by proxy between the fledgling communist Chinese state and the United States. A conflagration in Korea that pitted the United States against China would make any chance of rapprochement between the two states highly unlikely and would also fix American attention far from the Soviet vital ground in eastern Europe.Another key piece of evidence of Soviet strategy was revealed by the former Sovier premier Nikita Khrushchev. In his memoirs, Khrushchev gave an explanation of why Stalin decided to support Kim Il Sungs proposed invasion of the ROK. Khrushchev stated that when the United States Secretary of State (Dean Acheson) publicly stated that the ROK was outside of the United States Defence Perimeter10, this inadvertently sent a strong signal to Stalin that the RO K was a soft spot that was worth exploiting11. Stalin therefore reasoned that the United States would not commit forces to support the ROK governing in the event of a DPRK invasion12. Once it became clear that the Korean Peninsula would not be unified by diplomatic means, Stalin was content to sanction the use of military force (by his DPRK proxy) to bring about unification of Korea.The ultimate outcome of the Korean War did not meet the Soviet primary political goal of establishing a communist, unified Korea as the eventual cease fire line ran almost only along the 38th parallel. Despite this, it can be argued that the Soviet Union greatly benefited from the outcomes of the Korean War. The United States was badly shaken by the Chinese encumbrance in Nov 195013and the loss of American prestige was tangible when United Nations forces were forced into a pell-mell retreat south after the Chinese riposte in Nov 1950. The Korean War diverted the United States from what the Soviet Uni on determined as its vital ground in Europe. Korea also provided a means to test Soviet military capabilities in combat against the United States, especially in the air. Finally, Korea also allowed the Soviet Union to cement its relationship with China and prevent any rapprochement between China and the United States.The Soviet Union, by financing and supporting its Chinese and DPRK proxies was thus able to meet the majority of its aims, without becoming overtly involved in the fighting. On the minus side, Soviet support for the DPRK invasion unwittingly provided the justification for huge increases in United States military disbursal and the rearmament of West Germany and Japan. The Soviets were henceforth viewed as aggressors bent on spreading communism throughout the world, which the United States was clearly going to resist.United States Political Objectives and StrategyPrior to the eructation of the Korean War, debate was intense as to how the United States should respond to the perception that Soviet aggression in Europe and elsewhere was on the increase. With memories of the Berlin Airlift tranquilize fresh and communist ideology seemingly in the ascendancy everywhere, US policy makers sought to determine what course the United States should follow in retort to perceived Soviet aggression. A key strategy document outlined the United States response to the communist threat and was drafted in early Jan 1950 by the field of study Security Council (NSC). The resulting paper (NSC 68) aimed to define how the United States would respond to Soviet expansionist aims and also made predictions about the future nature of conflict between the superpowers in a bi-polar world post World War 2. While it was value that the main Soviet threat was most likely in Europe, NSC 68 recognised that the communist threat was global and would have to be countered. NSC 68 defined the United States options as natural selection 1 Maintain current policyOption 2 Adopt an Isolati onalist stanceOption 3 Go to war with the Soviet UnionOption 4 Fund and authorise a rapid build up of political, military and economic strength.14NSC 68 painted a dire picture of Soviet intentions and recommended that Option 4 was the preferred course to chart. The principal author (Paul H. Nitze) proposed radical steps, many of which were politically highly sensitive. Key recommendations were that West Germany should be rearmed as a priority and that a policy of Containment be adopted. Containment was defined asIt is one which seeks by all means short of war to (1) block further expansion of Soviet power, (2) expose the falsities of Soviet pretensions, (3) induce a retraction of the Kremlins control and influence, and (4) in general, so foster the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system that the Kremlin is brought at least to the point of modifying its behaviour to conform to primarily accepted international standards15.President Harry S. Truman was presented with the oddm ents from NSC 68 in Apr 1950. Its findings placed Truman in a dilemma although the United States still had many more nuclear weapons than the Soviet Union,16the United States could not afford the increase in conventional military spending and support to European nations proposed by the paper. The United States Congress had potently opposed increased military spending in favour of more spending within the United States. A fierce debate thus raged in the United States as to how perceived Soviet aggression should be responded to.United States policy towards the ROK was somewhat haphazard. As already mentioned, Acheson had publicly stated that the ROK was outside of the United States Defence Perimeter and relations with Rhee were often difficult given his bellicose nature and frequent outbursts about reunifying Korea by force. This prompted the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to matter for remaining US troops to be withdraw in order to concentrate on more important commitments elsewhe re. The last US troops were withdrawn late in 1949, which again seemed to signal to Kim Il Sung and Stalin that the United States would not intervene in the event of an invasion of the ROK.Meanwhile, the debate over the implications of NSC 68 continued to rage in Washington, with those in favour of increasing military spending gaining little traction in the face of harsh budget veryities. The invasion of the ROK on 25 Jun 1950 was greeted with shock in Washington and no doubt a degree of satisfaction by those that had signposted the Soviet inspired communist threat. American policy was thus immediately polarised and global US Political objectives were quickly wedded to the idea of Containment. The DPRK invasion of the ROK acted as an accelerant that ignited the United States commitment to argue what it perceived as the free nations of the world.Due to an ongoing Soviet boycott of the Untied Nations, the United States was able to secure the UNs approval for the use of force and qui ckly committed substantial forces in support of the United Nations Command (UNC) in order to restore ROK sovereign territory. With the support of the UN and the containment of DPRK forces at Pusan, many in the United States began to call for a more aggressive strategy to Rollback communism. The United States implemented its Rollback strategy in Korea after the successful landings at Inchon on 15 Sep 1950 had severed DPRK supply routes and seen communist forces retreat in disarray back over the 38th parallel. UN Security Council Resolutions 82 85 condemned DPRK actions and eventually gave UNC forces authority to proceed north across the 38th parallel with the express intent of removing Kim Il Sung and reunifying Korea as a nation state. What set out as an ideological stance taken in Washington to Rollback communism was thus implemented in reality in Korea, with poor results after decisive Chinese intervention. While it will be debated later in this essay if the UNC advance precipita ted Chinas entry into the conflict, it certainly was a contributory cypher.The United States was confirm to seek UN approval to use force to restore ROK territorial integrity Containment was a valid political objective that reassert the use of force in response to the perceived Soviet threat. The Rollback strategy was (with hindsight) unjustifiable and did not warrant the use of force in a vain attempt to unify Korea. Overall, and despite the ambiguity of its outcome, the Korean War had important implications for American foreign policy. In the short-term, the conflict globalized the policy of containment and was the impetus for vastly increased Defence spending and extensive US military deployments in Europe and elsewhere. The Korean War deepened the United States already combative relationship with the Soviet Union and effectively scuppered any possibility of cordial diplomatic relations with Communist China for twenty years. The outcome of the Korean War was satisfactory for t he United States. Communist advances had been contained and the ROK preserved as a bulwark against communism in Asia. Korea also had a far ranging impact on US policy and the policy of containment was to be applied to second Vietnam with disastrous results.ChinaIn Apr 1949, the Chinese Civil War ended in the decisive defeat of the Chinese Nationalists. A newly unified China under the leadership of Chairman Mao Zedong was keen to assert much greater influence in the region and this was to be a critical factor for the duration of the Korean War. United States support for the remnants of the Chinese Nationalist regime in Taiwan continued to be a major source of rubbing between the United States and China and was an underlying theme that determined Chinese political and strategic objectives in the region. As a result of the United States overt support of the Nationalist regime and the lack of Chinese counters to US military strength (particularly Naval), Mao was keen to determine if t here was an indirect means to confront the United States and perhaps even extract concessions over the future of the Nationalist redoubt in Taiwan.Chinas decision to enter the Korean War was determined by Chinese leaders interpretation of Chinas security interests and their judgment as to how Chinas security would be affected by entering the conflict. At this early juncture after the conclusion of the Chinese Civil War, the Chinese leadership was highly sensitive as to how Chinas stature, capability and willingness to defend its position were perceived by outsiders and particularly the West. China had suffered greatly at the hands of Great Britain and the USA and others during a prolonged period of foreign intervention in its affairs and Mao determined at an early stage that China would become involved in a Korean conflict if the situation dictated17. Once UN Forces crossed the 38th parallel in force and the Rollback strategy was openly advocated by the United States, the Rubicon wa s clearly crossed for the Chinese leadership and in particular Mao Zedong deviation them little choice but to act to defend its interests in the region. In essence, if all of Korea was occupied by UNC forces, then this would (in the eyes of the Chinese leadership) create a fatal danger to the fledgling Chinese variation.Chinas use of force to meet its strategic objectives was fully justified in the minds of the Chinese leadership. The sanctity of the Chinese revolution appeared to be under threat once Rollback gained significant support in the UN. It can also be argued that Mao saw a zip opportunity for China to deal an embarrassing blow to UN Forces by committing large numbers of Chinese volunteers at a decisive moment in the campaign. By committing Chinese forces to an ideological struggle such as Korea, Maos reasoning can be assessed as sound China would bolster its credibility within communist circles and perhaps emerge from the conflict as a beacon for other fledgling commun ist states so long as the west was prevented from securing success in Korea. Underlying much of Chinese strategic thought was the possibility that prolonged involvement in any Korean conflict had the potential to secure concessions from the United States over the future of Japan and crucially Taiwan. Chinese intransigence during the later stages of the Korean War can be attributed to not wishing to terminate the conflict until a more favourable situation had been achieved by communist forces and also Stalins wish to prolong the conflict to keep the USA involved in a peripheral action.DPRK Strategy and Political ObjectivesDPRK strategy was relatively simple once the division of Korea became permanent. Under the shrewd leadership of Kim Il Sung, the DPRK charted a course that contend the Soviet Union and China off each other in order to serve the DPRKs best interests. Once any hope of a diplomatic solution had vanished to unify Korea, Kim Il Sung determined that a narrow window of op portunity existed for the military unification of Korea. Indeed, the DPRKs invasion of the ROK perhaps provides the best suit of Clausewitzs dictum that war is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means18.On 7 March 1949, while talking to Stalin in Moscow Kim Il Sung say We believe that the situation makes it necessary and possible to liberate the whole country through military means. The Soviet leader apparently disagreed, citing the military weakness of the North, the Soviet-USA organisation on the 38th parallel division and the possibility of American intervention if the DPRK intervened militarily in the ROK. Stalin added that only if the ROK/USA attacked Pyongyang could the DPRK try military reunion by launching a counterattack. Then, the Kremlin chief explained, your move will be understood and supported by everyone.19On 17 January 1950, Kim Il Sung complained to the Sovie t ambassador Shtykov I cant sleep at night because I am thinking of the unification of the whole country. If the cause is postponed, then I whitethorn lose the confidence of the Korean people. Kim Il Sung apparently requested permission to make a new visit to the USSR to receive orders and permission from Stalin for the nauseated20. This is a key point for Kim Il Sung, the war was as much about maintaining popular consent for his regime as it was for unifying Korea.The DPRK was essentially justified in resorting to the use of force in its attempt to unify Korea. This is a contentious point of view, but it can be argued that as the Korean War was essentially a civil war, then once diplomatic means had been exhausted, the only way left to Sung was to exhort the Soviet Union and China to support a military endeavour to unify the Korean peninsula. It could also be argued that had the ROK not been supported by the United States, then the ideological and flag-waving(a) tensions in Korea would have played out after a period of internal wrangling. Korea would have likely emerged after the end of the Cold War as a stable, unified state that would have been open to capitalist influence (like many former Warsaw Pact states) and not the insular, paranoid autocracy that still persists. The outcomes of the Korean War essentially did not meet the primary aim of the DPRK to unify Korea, but did run across the continued support and investment of the Soviet Union and China, much as the United States supported the ROK.ROK Political and Strategic objectivesROK strategy was again relatively simple. By continually agitating against the communist DPRK regime, Rhee hoped to draw the United States into a Korean Civil War in order to enable the unification of Korea by force. Many accounts of the time place the blame squarely on the DPRK for invading the ROK, but this is too simplistic. Rhee continually blustered that he would lead an ROK invasion of the DPRK to reunite Korea. On a v isit with The US Secretary of State (John rear Dulles) a reporter (William Mathews of the Arizona Daily Star) recorded that He Rhee is militantly for the unification of Korea. Openly says it must be brought about soonRhee pleads justice of going into North country. Thinks it could succeed in a few days If he can do it with our help, he will do it21. Rhee was an ardent nationalist and was clearly set on reuniting Korea by any means, so long as he had the support of the United States to do so. ROK forces were responsible for repeated violations of the 38th parallel and ROK initiated ordnance exchanges were commonplace from Spring 1949 onwards22. Continued United States military support was thus at times difficult to justify in the face of touch commitments elsewhere and the Joint Chiefs of Staff finally withdrew all but a attribute force of advisors in late 194923.The primary political objective of the ROK can thus be clearly identified as seeking to secure and maintain United Sta tes military, economic and political involvement in the ROK. In this, the Rhee regime was entirely successful as the Korean War precipitated massive United States military, economic and political support which extends to the present day. Indeed, the prolonged nature of the conflict served to ensure that the Korean conflict was centre stage of the Truman/Eisenhower Presidential Election. Rhee and his regime survived the war intact and the experience of the conflict had a direct influence on ROK governance for two generations with successive semi military dictatorships controlling ROK affairs.The United NationsFacing its sternest test, the United Nations had weathered a challenge, which, if unanswered, might have resulted in disaster and eventual disintegration. Under the U.N. flag, the original objective of the intervention in Korea-halting Communist aggression-had been successfully carried out and the independence of its foster child, the Republic of Korea, had been preserved. This practical demonstration of how the United Nations could post when peace was threatened greatly enhanced the prestige of the organization and established a precedent for future U.N. military action if the need should again arise.The move had not been given unanimous support by U.N. members, it is true, but twentyone nations had contributed forces of one kind or another to sustain the U.N. decision. Although many of these countries had supplied only small token units, the mere fact that they had participated at all was encouraging, since it indicated their belief in the U.N. and their willingness to put teeth in the enforcement provisions of its charter. The Korean War marked a real departure from the dismal experience of the League of Nations in this respect.Conclusions